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Abstract
In this paper we introduce self-justiﬁed equilibrium as a solution concept in stochastic
general equilibrium models with a large number of heterogeneous agents. In each period agents
trade in assets to maximize the sum of current utility and forecasted future utility. Current
prices ensure that markets clear and agents forecast the probability distribution of future prices
and consumption on the basis of current endogenous variables and the current exogenous shock.
The forecasts are self-justiﬁed in the sense that agents use forecasting functions that are optimal
within a given class of functions and that can be viewed as optimally trading oﬀ the accuracy
of the forecast and its complexity.
We show that self-justiﬁed equilibria always exist and we develop a computational method to
approximate them numerically. By restricting the complexity of agents' forecasts we can solve
models with a very large number of heterogeneous agents. Errors can be directly interpreted.
˚Preliminary and Incomplete
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1 Introduction
The assumption of rational expectations and the use of recursive methods to analyze dynamic
economic models has revolutionized ﬁnancial economics, macroeconomics and public ﬁnance (see
e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012)). Unfortunately, for stochastic general equilibrium models with
a large number heterogeneous agents rational expectations equilibria are generally not tractable,
computational methods to approximate these equilibria numerically are often ad hoc, and rigorous
error analysis seems impossible. Moreover, in these models, known suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of stationary Markov equilibria are very restrictive (see Citanna and Siconolﬁ (2012)
or Brumm et al. (2017)). In this paper we develop an alternative to rational expectations equilibria
and consider temporary equilibria with forecasting functions that are optimal within a given class but
that might lead to incorrect forecasts at any given time. These self-justiﬁedequilibria always exist
and we show that by restricting the complexity of agents' forecasts one can numerically appoximate
them for models with very many agents.
The basic idea of the approach is as follows. In a temporary equilibrium agents use current
endogenous variables and the shock to forecast future prices and prices for commodities and assets
in the current period ensure that markets clear. The forecasts are assumed to be functions that lie in
a pre-speciﬁed class (a simple example are semi-algebraic functions of ﬁxed description complexity)
- the agent chooses a function to minimize a loss function of average realizations of marginal utilities
along the equilibrium path and the forecasts. In the temporary equilibrium these expectations might
be far from correct and agents might make large mistakes. However, they forecasts are optimal given
the agents' constraints. The concept does not require identical expectations or identical forecasts
across agents. Diﬀerent types of agents can have diﬀerent expectations and diﬀerent forecasting
functions.
To prove existence of self-justiﬁed equilibrium we make the simplifying assumption that account-
ing is ﬁnite. That is to say, we assume that beginning-of-period portfolios across agents lie on some
ﬁnite (arbitrarily ﬁne) grid and that agents' portfolio-choices in the current period induce a prob-
ability distribution over this grid. This assumption can be viewed as a technical approximation to
a continuous model, but one can also think of bounded rationality justiﬁcations. For example, one
might to assume that at the beginning of a period an agent cannot measure his ﬁnancial wealth with
arbitrary precision and makes small errors in rounding. In any case, while the assumption is nec-
essary for the technical argument is has no eﬀect on the computed solutions since all computations
are necessarily using ﬁnite precision arithmetics.
There is a large and diverse body of work exploring deviations from rational expectation (see,
e.g., Spear (1989), Sargent (1993), Guesnerie (2001,2005), Gabaix (2014), Adam et al. (2016)).
Much of this work is motivated by insights from behavioral economics about agents' behavior or
by the search for simple economic mechansism that enrich the observable implications of standard
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models. The motivation of this paper is rather diﬀerent in that we want to develop a simple
alternative to rational expectations that allows researchers to rigorously analyze stochastic dynamic
models with heterogeneous agents.
As Sargent (1993) points out, when implemented numerically ... rational expectations models
impute more knowledge to the agent within the model ... than is possessed by an econometri-
cian, and a sensible approach to relax rational expectations is expelling rational agents from our
model environment and replacing them with `artiﬁcially intelligent 'agents how behave like econo-
metricians.This quote emodies the idea underlying self-justiﬁed equilibria  in order to construct
a tractable model of the macro-economy that takes into account substantial heterogeneity across
agents one needs to assume that agents' expectations can actually be computed by the modeler.
Applied dynamic general equilibrium modeling has been critized for its failure to take into ac-
count the large heterogeneity in tastes and technologies across agents. Farmer and Foley (2009)
make this point forefully and strongly advocate the use of so called agent-based models to under-
stand macro-economy dynamics. An agent-based model is a computerized simulation of a number
of decision-makers and institutions, which interact through prescribed rules. The agents can be as
diverse as needed but, as Baptista et al. (2016) point out, in these agent based models behavioral
rules are often arbitrary. Up to now it seemed to complicated to incorporate substantial hetero-
geneity into in large-scale dynamic GE models because existing solution methods are not able to
handle this amount of heterogeneity. Using the concept of self-justiﬁed equilbria, one can incorpo-
rate large scale heterogenity into general equilibrium models, potentially improve their usefulness
for applied work and bridge the gap between agent based modeling and applied general equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the general economy is introduced.
2 A general dynamic Markovian economy
We consider a Bewley-style overlapping generations model (see Bewley (1984)) with incomplete
ﬁnancial markets and a continuum of agents. Time is indexed by t P N0. Exogenous shocks
zt realize in a complete, separable metric space Z, and follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process with
transition probability Pp.|zq deﬁned on the Borel σ-algebra Z on Zthat is, P : Z ˆ Z Ñ r0, 1s.
Let pztq8t“0, or in short pztq, denote this stochastic process and let pFtq denote its natural ﬁltration
(i.e., the smallest ﬁltration such that pztq is Ft-adapted). A history of shocks up to some date t
is denoted by zt “ pz0, z1, . . . , ztq and called a date event. Whenever convenient, we simply use t
instead of zt.
At each date event a continuum of ex ante identical agents enter the economy, live for A periods,
and diﬀer ex post by the realization of their idiosyncratic shocks. Each agent faces idiosyncratic
shocks, y1, ..., yA, that have support in a ﬁnite set Y
A. We denote by ηyapya`1q the (conditional)
probability of idiosyncratic shock ya`1 for an agent with shock history ya, η0py1q to denote the
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probability of idiosyncratic shock y1 at the beginning of life, and, ηpyaq to denote the probability of
a history of idiosyncratic shocks. We assume that the idiosyncratic shocks are independent of the
aggregate shock, that they are identically distributed across agents within each type and age and,
as in the construction in Proposition 2 in Feldman and Gilles (1985), that they cancel out in the
aggregate, that is, the joint distribution of idiosyncratic shocks within a type ensures that at each
history of aggregate shocks, zt, for any ya P Ya the fraction of agents with history ya “ py1, ..., yaq
is ηpyaq. This allows the focus on equilibria for which prices and aggregate quantities only depend
on the history of aggregate shocks, zt. I denote the set of all date events at time t by Zt and, taking
z0 as ﬁxed, I write z
t P Zt for any t P N0 (including t “ 0). At each zt there are ﬁnitely many
diﬀerent agents actively trading (distinguishing themselves by age and history of shocks), who are
collected in a set I “ YAa“1Ya. A speciﬁc agent at a given node zt is denoted by ya P I.
At each date event there is a single perishable commodity, the individual endowments are denoted
by eyapztq P R` and assumed to be time-invariant and measurable functions of the current aggregate
shock1. Each agent who can be identiﬁed by his date-event of birth, zt, has a time-separable expected
utility function
Uztppxt`aqA´1a“0 q “ Et
«
Aÿ
a“1
uya
`
xzt,t`a´1
˘ff
,
where xzt,t`a´1 P R` denotes the agent's (stochastic) consumption at date t` a´ 1.
There are J assets, j P J “ t1, . . . , Ju traded at each date event. Assets can be inﬁnitely lived
Lucas trees in unit net supply or one-period ﬁnancial assets in zero net supply. The net supply of
an asset j is denoted by θ¯j P t0, 1u. Assets are traded at prices q and their (non-negative) payoﬀs
depend on the aggregate shock and possibly on the current prices of the assets fj : RJ` ˆ Z Ñ R`.
If asset j is a Lucas tree (i.e., an asset in positive net supply), then fjpq, zq “ qj ` djpzq for some
dividends dj : Z Ñ R`. Asset j could also be a collateralized loan whose payoﬀ depends on the
value of the underlying collateral, or an option, or simply a risk-free asset. The aggregate dividends
of the trees are deﬁned as dpztq “ θ¯ ¨ fpqpztq, ztq ´ θ¯ ¨ qpztq. An agent ya faces trading constraints
θ P Θya Ă RJ , where ΘyA “ t0u for all yA P YA. To simplify notation we write ~θ “ pθyaqyaPI,
~θ´ “ pθy´aqyaPI and ~x “ pxyaqyaPI.
It is useful to deﬁne the set of possible portfolio holdings with market-clearing built-in as
Θ “ t~θ :
ÿ
yaPI
ηpyaqθya “ θ¯, θya P Θya for all ya´1 P Iu.
Similarly let the set of all beginning-of-period portfolio holdings be
Θ´ “ t~θ´ : θ´
y1
“ 0,
ÿ
ya´1PI
ηpya´1qθy´a “ θ¯ and θy´a P Θya´1 for all yau.
1As opposed to the standard formulation where an agent's fundamentals are functions of his current idiosyncratic
shock, y, we assume that they are functions of the history of all shocks - clearly these formulations are equivalent if
one allows for a suﬃciently rich set Y.
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2.1 Finite accounting
The ﬁrst crucial and non-standard assumption of the paper is that accounting is ﬁnite, i.e. actual
beginning of period portfolios lie in a ﬁnite set. This assumption will allow us to obtain simple
existence results below but it comes at the cost of some opaqueness.
We assume that the space of exogenous shocks can be decomposed into two complete, separable
metric spaces, Z “ Z0ˆZ1 with Borel σ-algebra Z “ Z0bZ1, and the shock is given by z “ pz0, z1q.
We assume that z0 is independent across time and independent of z1, and that z0 does not aﬀect
fundamentals other than a rounding shock  which is only determined by z0.
We let pΘ´ Ă Θ´ be a ﬁnite set and assume that given ~θpztq, we have
~θ´pzt`1q P arg min
~θ´P pΘ´ }θ¯ ` pzt`1q ´ θ´}2,
with θ¯ya “ θya´1 for all a “ 2, . . . A, ya P Ya and θ¯y1 “ 0 for all y1 P Y. In this formulation pz0q
should be interpreted as a (small) rounding error.
Since we assume that 0 is iid and since it only aﬀects the current rounding error we can deﬁne
the aggregate state space to only contain the z1 shock. We then denote by S “ Z1 ˆ pΘ´ the
(aggregate) state-space.
Note that can think of the rounding error alternatively as follows. A proﬁle of choices in the
current period, ~θ P Θ, given current shock z P Z, induces a probability distribution µ
z,~θ
over states
in the subsequent period s P S. We denote by G the number of elements in pΘ´ and by ∆ZG´1 the
ZG ´ 1 dimensional unit simplex in RZG. This allows us to write µ
z,~θ
P ∆ZG´1 and, in a slight
abuse of notation µ : ZˆΘ Ñ ∆ZG´1.
Assuming ﬁnite accounting has several justiﬁcations. As stated we assume that agents take
the fact that beginning-of-period portfolios always lie on a ﬁnite grid as a technological constraint.
Alternatively we could assume that actual portfolios lie in Θ´ but that agent cannot measure their
wealth arbirarily ﬁnely and make their decisions based on rounded values, exhibiting some degree
of bounded rationality. This would lead to similar results, but it turns out to be simpler to view
the ﬁniteness of Θ´ as a trading constraint. From a practical point of view the assumption seems
innocuous. Because of ﬁnite precision arithmetic in scientiﬁc computations and numerical method
will lead to ~θ´ lying on a (possibly very ﬁne) grid. However, from a technical point, the assumption
turns out to be crucial. It is not clear which of our results hold true in the limit as the grid becomes
dense in Θ´. Throughout it is assumed that the support of p.q is centered around zero and very
small.
Unfortuantely, ﬁnite accounting makes the maximization problem of the agent very complicated
as the optimal solution cannot be characterized by ﬁrst order conditions. In fact in order to deﬁne
the maximization problem formally we would need to specify the conditional probability of and
individual's portfolio on the grid, given the choices of all other agents. Instead we assume that the
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agent solves a continuous and convex problem. Given the transition of the aggregate state Qps1|sq
each agent ya's value function is a function of the aggregate state and his individual portolﬁo's and
it is given by
Vyaps, θ´q “ max
θPΘya ,xPR`
uyapxq `
ÿ
s1PS
Qps1|sq
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qVyaps1, θyaq (1)
s.t. x` θ ¨ qpsq “ fpqpsq, zq ¨ θ´ ` eyapzq
The agent is bounded rational as the solution to this problem will not be identical to the actual
optimal solution. However, if rΘ is suﬃciently ﬁne the solutions will be very close.
2.2 Recursive equilibria
It is useful to start our analysis by deﬁning a recursive equilibrium with rational expectations.
In this context almost rational expectations means that agents correctly forecast all future prices
conditional on shocks, but, and therefore the "almost", they make (arbitrarily small) systematic
mistakes in that they think that the portfolio they choose in the current period carries over to the
subsequent period (i.e. while they understand that states are ﬁnite they do not understand that
their own portfolio gets randomly rounded to lie on the the ﬁnite grid).
The formal deﬁnition is as follows.
Definition 1 A recursive equilibrium consists of a function ρq : S Ñ RJ`, ρ~θ : S Ñ RJ and a transition
Qps1|sq and well as value functions for all agent ya P I that depend on the aggregate state s, and the
agents' beginning of period portfolio θy´a , i.e. Vya : SˆΘy,a Ñ R, such that
• Each agent ya solves his maximization problem, for all s P S
ρθya psq “ arg max
θPΘya ,xPR`
uyapxq `
ÿ
s1PS
Qps1|sq
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qVya`1ps1, θyaq
s.t. x` θ ¨ qpsq “ fpqpsq, zq ¨ θy´a ` eyapzq,
where Vyap.q solve (1).
• Markets clear, i.e. ÿ
ya
ηpyaqρθya psq “ θ¯, for all s P S
• Agents forecast future states correctly
Qps1|sq “ µz,ρ~θpsqps1q
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3 Self justiﬁed equilibria
In a competitive environment agents choose asset-holdings in the current period to maximize ex-
pected utility and current prices ensure that markets clear. In order to understand how today's
asset choices aﬀect future utilities the agent needs to form some expectations about future prices
and compute his optimal life-cycle asset-holdings under these prices. In the deﬁnition of a recur-
sive equilbirium it is assumed that the agent knows the state transition and the map from states
to prices. For economies with a very large number of agents this seems unrealistic. It certainly
leads to a situation where equilibrium cannot be approximated numerically. In order to relax this
assumption it turns out to be useful to model the forecasting of prices and the recursive solution of
the agents' problem in one step and assume that the agents' expectations are over the next period's
marginal utility of asset holdings. We ﬁrst reformulate a recursive equilibrium in this framework
and we then allow these forecasts to be imperfect and heterogneous across agents.
Each agent, ya P I, is characterized by a functions Mya : Z ˆΘ Ñ RJ` that predicts marginal
utilities of assets in the next period on the basis of the current portfolio-holdings across agents and
the current shock. We denote by M “ ˆyaPIMya and write ~M “ pMyaqyaPI. Throughout we assume
that MyAp.q “ 0 for all yA P YA, forecasts of agents of age A are irrelevant.
Assuming concavity of utility, the ﬁrst order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for agents'
optimality and we can write an agent ya's maximization problem as
max
xPR`,θPΘya
uyapxq `Myapz, ~θyaq ¨ θ s.t.
x` θ ¨ q¯ ´ eyapzq ´ θy´a ¨ fpq¯, zq ě 0.
The agent takes as given current average portfolio choices across all agents, ~θ and current prices q.
The function Myap.q is part of the agent's characteristics - we impose rationality assumptions on
this, depending on the equilibrium concept.
We deﬁne the temporary equilibrium correspondence
N : SˆM Ñ RI` ˆΘˆ RJ
as
Nps, ~Mq “ tpx¯ya , θ¯yaqyaPI, q¯q P RI` ˆΘˆ RJ` : (2)
px¯ya , θ¯yaq P arg max
xyaPR`,θyaPΘya
uyapxyaq `Myapz, pθ¯yaqyaPIq ¨ θya s.t.
xya ` θya ¨ q¯ ´ eyapzq ´ θy´a ¨ fpq¯, zq ě 0 for all ya P Iu.
Assuming that for a given ~M the set Nps, ~Mq is non-empty for all s P S there exists a single
valued selection Nps; ~Mq because S is ﬁnite. We write
Nps; ~Mq “
´
N~xps; ~Mq, N~θps; ~Mq, Nqps; ~Mq
¯
.
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Before deﬁning a self-justiﬁed equilibrium it useful to derive the functions ~Mp.q for the case of
a recursive (rational expectations) equilibrium. Given a recursive equilibrium with value functions
Vyap.q and policy functions ρ there must a selection Np., ~Mq of Np., ~Mq such that for all s P S, if
My,apz,N~θps; ~Mqq “
ÿ
s1PS
µz,N~θps; ~Mqps
1q
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qBVya`1Bθ pθya , sq
The crucial innovation of this paper is to allow for hetergeneous and possibly incorrect forecasts
across agents. We assume that the agents deviate from rational expectations with respect to one
crucial aspects: They cannot evaluate (or store) arbitrary functions but instead approximate the
equilibrium forecasts by simple  functions. These functions could be simple because they aggregate
~θ into a lower dimensional vector, or because they belong to some convenient class of functions - a
simple example would be semi-algebraic functions of ﬁxed description complexity, we give another
example in the computational section below.
Each agents ya considers a set of functions Mya to choose from, has an inﬁnite amount of
information on equlibrium allocations and prices and minimizes the weighted sum of a loss-function
Lyap.q to obtain his forcasting function Mya . We assume that the loss function is a function of
the realized marginal utility, the forecasted marginal utility and the forecasting function, Lya :
RJ `ˆRJ` ˆMya Ñ R to allow for the possibility that the agent trades oﬀ between more accurate
forecasts and more complex forecasting functions. The formal deﬁnition of a self-justiﬁed equilibirum
is as follows.
Definition 2 A self-justiﬁed equilibrium consists of forecasts ~M P M, a selection Np.; ~Mq of Np., ~Mq,
and a measure P on S, such that
1. P is invariant given the law of motion induced by Np.q, that is to say for all s1 P S
Pps1q “
ÿ
sPS
PpsqµN~θps; ~Mqps
1q
2. For each ya, a ă A, Mya provides the best average approximation under this measure, i.e.
Mya P arg min
MPMya
ÿ
sPS
PpsqLya
´
Mpz,N~θps; ~Mqq,mpsq,Mp.q
¯
,
where
mpsq “
ÿ
s1PS
µz,N~θps; ~Mqps
1qfpNqps1; ~Mqq
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qu1ya`1pNxya`1 ps1; ~Mqq
Similarly to the concept of self-conﬁrmingequilbirium (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1993)
or Cho and Sargent (2008)) a self-justiﬁed equilibrium can be interpreted as the outcome of a
learning-process which itself is not modeled in the theory. The crucial diﬀerence is that in a self-
justiﬁed equilibrium an agent's forecasts can be incorrect in every step, as long as they are the best
forecasts the agent can choose.
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Note that in this deﬁnition the value function does not occur and
BVya`1
Bθ pθya , sq is replaced by
u1ya`1pNxya`1 ps1; ~Mqq. This is motivated by the idea that a self-justiﬁed equilibrium is a stationary
point of a learning process where agents learn to forecasts prices as well as their own value function.
Since consumption is only observed on the ﬁnite set S we assume that agents approximate the
derivative of their value function at θya by the derivative of the value function at θ
´
ya`1 . If the gridpΘ´ is suﬃciently ﬁne this diﬀerence is like to be tiny. By the envelope theorem
BVya`1
Bθ pθ
´
ya`1 , sq “ u1ya`1pNxya`1 ps1; ~Mqq.
4 Existence
Througout the paper we make the following assumptions on fundamentals.
Assumption 1
1. For each ya P I the Bernoulli-utility function uyap.q is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and satisﬁes an Inada conditions
u1yapxq Ñ 8 as xÑ 0,
individual Endowments are positive, i.e.,
eyapzq ą 0 for all z P Z.
2. The set Θ is compact and for each ya P I the set Θya is a closed convex cones containing RJ`.
3. The payoﬀ functions, f : RJ` ˆ Z Ñ RJ are non-negative valued and continuous. Moreover, for
any i, j “ 1, . . . , J the payoﬀ fjpqq only depends on qi if θ¯i ą 0.
4. For all θ´ P Θya´1
θy´a ¨ fpq, zq ě 0 for all q P RJ`, z P Z.
5. The function µ : ZˆΘ Ñ ∆ZG´1 is continuous in ~θ for all z P Z.
Assumptions 1.1-1.3 are standard. Assumption 1.4 is motivated by collateral and default. Con-
straints ensure that agents cannot borrow against future endowments. In our formulation this
is true independently of prices  we implicitly allow for default (see e.g. Kubler and Schmedders
(2003)). Assumption 1.5 is satisﬁed if p.q has a continuous probability density function.
Since we assumed Θ´ to be ﬁnite, for ﬁxed ~M P M a selection of the temporary equilibrium
correspondence can be viewed as a vector N P `RI` ˆΘˆ RJ`˘GZ . We make the following reduced-
form assumption on forecasting- and loss functions.
Assumption 2
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1. For all µ P ∆ZG´1 and all N P `RI` ˆΘˆ RJ`˘GZ the following
ĂMyapN,µq “ arg min
MPMya
ÿ
sPS
µpsqLya pMpz,Nθpsqq,mpsq,Mp.qq ,
mpsq “
ÿ
s1PS
µNθpsqps1qfpNqps1qq
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qu1ya`1pNxya`1 ps1qq,
is well deﬁned (i.e. the arg min exists and is unique). The function ĂMyapN,µ, pz, ~θyaqq is jointly
continuous in pN,µ, ~θq for all z P Z.
2. All functions in M are uniformly bounded above, i.e. there is some m¯ such that
Mya,jpz, ~θq ă m¯ for all z P Z, ~θ P Θ, j P J and ya P I
Assumption 2.1 is quite strong since it rules out arbitrarily optimistic expecations. Without
further specifying M and Lp.q it is needed for some of our results, however.
With these assumptions existence of a self-justiﬁed equilibrium simply reduces to the existence
of a ﬁnite-dimensional ﬁxed point, in particular - the main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1-2 there exists a self-justiﬁed equilibrium.
Proof. We decompose the economy into sub-economies for each s P S. Assumption 1.3 implies
that there exist l, r such that whenever ~θ P Θ,
l ă θya,j ă r for all ya P I, j P J.
Let T “ rl, rsJ and let X “ r0,maxzPZyaPI epzq`dpzqηpyaq s. Assumption 2.2 guarantees that any forecast
is bounded above by m¯. Let O “ r0, m¯sJGZ .
We construct a upper-hemi-continuous, non-empty and convex-valued correspondence, Φq¯, map-
ping pXI ˆ TI ˆ ∆JqGZ ˆ∆GZ ˆ OI to itself which has a ﬁxed point. We then argue that this
implies the existence of a self-justiﬁed equilibrium.
For all ya P I and all s P S let
Φya,spMs, pps, qsqq “ arg max
xPX,θPΘyaXT
uyapxq `Ms ¨ θ s.t.
pxya ´ eyapzqq ` θya ¨ 1
ps
qs ´ θy´a ¨ fp 1ps qs, zq ď 0
and let
Φ0,sp~θs, ~xsq “ arg maxpp,qqP∆J pp
ÿ
yaPI
ηpyaqpxya,s ´ eyapzq ´ dpzqqq ` q ¨ p
ÿ
yaPI
ηpyaqpθya,s ´ θ¯qq
Let
Φµpp~θsqsPSq “ pµpsq
ÿ
s1PS
µ
z,~θs
ps1qqsPS
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and let
ΦMya pµ, p~xs, ~θs, ps, qsqsPSq “ pĂMyapsqqsPS,
where ĂMya “ arg min
MPMya
ÿ
sPS
µpsqLya
´
Mpz, ~θsq,mpsq,Mp.q
¯
,
with
mpsq “
ÿ
s1PS
µ
z,~θs
ps1qfp 1
ps1
qs1q
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qu1ya`1pxya`1ps1qq.
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that the mapping Φ “ ˆsPS ppˆyaPIΦya,sq ˆΦ0,sqˆΦMya ˆΦµ,
Φ:pXˆTˆ∆JqGZ ˆ∆GZ´1 ˆOI Ñ pXˆTˆ∆JqGZ ˆ∆GZ´1 ˆOI
is non-empty and convex valued and upper hemi-continuous. By Kakutani's ﬁxed point theorem
there exists a ﬁxed point. Assumption 1 guarantees that the additional constraints imposed by T
and X are not binding, and hence this ﬁxed point is a self-justiﬁed equilbirium. l
Using the exact same proof strategy we can prove the existence of a self-justiﬁed equilibrium
where forecasts are correct.
Proposition 1 There is a ~M and a selection Np.q of N such that for each ya, Mya provides a correct
forecast, i.e. for all s P S
Mpz,N~θps; ~Mqq “ mpsq
where
mpsq “
ÿ
s1PS
µz,N~θps; ~Mqps
1qfpNqps1; ~Mqq
ÿ
ya`1PY
ηyapya`1qu1ya`1pNxya`1 ps1; ~Mqq
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1. The only diﬀerence is that we do not need to
proof the existence of an invariant distribution and ΦMya pµ, p~xs, ~θs, ps, qsqsPSq is simply set equal
to the expected marginal utility, i.e.
The discretization of the state-space enables us to prove a very simple result  without this,
strong assumptions are needed to ensure the existence of a recursive rational expectations equilib-
rium (see Brumm et al. (2017)).
5 A simple introductory examples
In order to illustrate the concept of self-justiﬁed equilibria and to describe our general computational
strategy below it is useful to focus on a speciﬁc simple example. In the simplest example we assume
that agents live for 60 periods and that there is a single agent per generation. Agents can trade
in a single Lucas-tree and in Arrow securities. In our framework it is useful to assume that the
Arrow-securities pay in the Lucas-tree (as in Gottardi and Kubler (2015)). In this example we make
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the strong assumption that agents only take their own asset holdings to forecast future M and that
their forecasts a linear.
It turns out that for simple calibrations of the model forecasts in a self-justiﬁed equilibrium are
extremely accurate.
Assuming that agents form simple linear forecasts using only their own asset holdings, an agent
ya's chooses θya P RZ` to solve
max
θPRS`,xě0
uyapxq `
ÿ
z1PZ
paya,z,z1 ` bya,z,z1 θ¯z
s.t. eyapzq ` θy´a,zpq ` dpzqq ´
ÿ
z1
θya,z1qpz, z1q
Where θ¯z equals the chosen θya,z
Clearly we make two strong assumptions in this example. First we assume that agents only use
their own choices to forecasts future marginal utilities. This implies that prices are just a function
of the shock and as it would be the case, choices depend on asset positions.
Second the agents have linear forecasts. This is obviously incorrect for agents of age A´1, their
consumption is linear in asset holdings, by concavity their marginal utility is non-linear. However,
it is not clear how much asset holdings vary in a self-justiﬁed equilibrium. As it turns out a linear
approximation is sometimes accurate.
5.1 The computational strategy
In this simple setup the computation of self-justiﬁed equilibria is very simple and reduces to linear
regression and the repeated solution of non-linear systme of equations. In particular we employ an
iterative scheme to solve for the optimal forecasting functions.
It is useful to deﬁne the temporary equilibrium system of inequalities as the system of all agents'
KKT-conditions together with the Z market clearing conditions, i.e.
F ppθyaq, q, κya |θy´aq “
$’’&’’%
´u1yapeyapzq ` θ´pq ` dpzq ´ q ¨ θqqz ` βMyapz, z1, θyaq ` κya,z1 for all ya, z1
κya ¨ θyař
ya θyapz1q “ 0, for all z1 P Z
(3)
The details of the algorithm are then as follows:
1. Make an initial guess for each agent's forecasting
M0ya,z1 : Zˆ R` Ñ R`
with
M0ya,z1pz, θzq “ aya,z,z1 ` bya,z,z1θz.
Choose an approximation accuracy η¯.
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2. Make one time iteration step:
(a) For NSIM periods, simulate a noisy temporary equilibrium for givne forecastsM0. That
is to say starting with some z, θ´ solve the system (3). using pseudo random numbers
draw a new z1 and set θy´a “ θya´1,z1 ` .
(b) Regress the equilibrium values of pqz`dpzqqu1pxq on θz to obtain new coeﬃcients aya,z,z1 , bya,z,z1
and a new forecastig function M1
3. If
}M1 ´M0} ă η
then setM˚ “M1 and terminate the algorithm. Else setM0 “M1 and repeat time iteration
step.
The temporary equilibrium needs to be noisy for the computations to work. Since many young
agents never choose to save in equilibrium we cannot determine their forecasts for regions where
they would save. Therefore, with low probability, we have that agents wake up with assets although
they never saved.
5.2 A simple self-justiﬁed equilibrium with accurate forecasts
For the simplest example, assume that A “ 60, Z “ 2 and that there is a single agent per generation.
The agent has CRRA utility function with uyapcq “ βa c1´γ1´γ . We take β “ 0.96, γ “ 2. Individual
endowments are
eap1q “ 0.4` a{500, eap2q “ 0.9 ˚ p0.4` a{500q for a ă 50
eap1q “ eap2q “ 0.4 for a ě 50.
Also assume that dpzq “ 2 for both z “ 1, 2. and that pip1q “ pip2q “ 12 .
In the computed self-justiﬁed equilibrium forecasting errors are tiny, they are the smallest for
young agents (around 0.01 percent) and the largest for old agents (around 0.5 percent). Average
errors across agents are about 0.1 percent.
This result is of course consistent with many examples in the literature where one ﬁnds pseudo
aggregation (most notably Krusell and Smith (1996)) and Chien et al. (2011)). The main reason
why the simple forecasts fare well in this example is that there is almost no variation in asset hold-
ings. In Figure 1 we show the forecasts of an agent of age 5 in shock 1 for next period's shock 1.
As one can see in the FIgure, there is only a tiny variation in asset holdings and realized marginal
utiliies and forecasted marginal utiliies more or less coincide.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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One motivation for self-justiﬁed equilibrium is to ﬁnd a way to systematically make agents more
rational if needed. For this we ﬁrst need to construct a simple example where forecasts that do not
take into account the wealth distribution across agents do not do a very good job.
5.3 Moving away from the simple example
As it turns out, the result that linear forecasts are quite accurate holds true for a wide variety of
parameter speciﬁcations. One simple case where this breaks down can be obtained by assuming
that agents across generations have diﬀerent subjective beliefs over the aggregate shocks. While this
does not really ﬁt our model and does not ﬁt the idea that the agents know invariant distributions
it gives us a simple model to compare diﬀerent algorithms.
Concretely we modify the simple example above in assuming that agents of ages 1-10 and of
ages 50-59 have incorrect probabilities in that
piap1q “ 0.6, piap2q “ 0.4 for a “ 1, . . . 10
piap1q “ 0.4, piap2q “ 0.6 for a “ 50, . . . 59.
All other agents have the correct beliefs.
With this speciﬁcation forecasts a systematically misspeciﬁed not only because they are linear
but mainly because future marginal utilities for asset holding do not only depend on own choices.
Figure 2 depicts the same forecasting function as Figure 1, but for this speciﬁcation with hetero-
geneous beliefs. Clearly linear functions do not do a good job, but moreover, it is clear that other
variables have to be added to make forecasts good.
[Figure 2 about here]
In the next section we give an overview over the approximation method we use. We then show
how our general computational strategy is a straightforward generalization of the simple method
described in this section.
6 Function approximation on high-dimensional and irregularly-shaped
domains
To solve for self-justiﬁed equlibria in general, we need to repeatedly approximate and interpolate
multi-variate policy function on irregularly-shapedthat is, non-hypercubic domains. In such en-
vironments, standard grid-based methods such as Smolyak (see, e.g., Krueger and Kubler (2004)
and Judd et al. (2014)) or adaptive sparse grids (see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger (2017) and
Brumm et al. (2015)), will fail. To this end, we will follow closely Scheidegger and Bilionis (2017)
and use Gaussian process regression (GPR) (see, e.g., Rasmussen and Williams (2005) and Sec. 6.1)
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in combination with active subspaces (see, e.g., Constantine et al. (2014) and Sec. 6.2) and Bayesian
Gaussian mixture models (see, e.g., Rasmussen (2000) and Sec. 6.3).
6.1 Gaussian process regression
Below, we provide a very brief introduction to Gaussian process regression (GPR) based on Ras-
mussen and Williams (2005) and Scheidegger and Bilionis (2017), and references therein.
GPR is a nonparametric regression method from supervised machine learning, and addresses
the problem of learning inputoutput mappings from observed datathe so-called training set. In
our case, observations stem from a computer code. Given a data set D “ t`xpiq, tpiq˘ |i “ 1, ..., µu
consisting of µ input vectors xpiq P RN and corresponding, potentially noisy, observations tpiq “
fpxpiqq ` ,  „ N `0, σ2 ˘, we want to deduce a model of the unknown function f that generated
the data such that we then can make predictions for new inputs x˚ that we have not seen in the
training set. The matrix
X “
!
xp1q, . . . ,xpµq
)
(4)
is commonly referred to as training inputs, and
t “
!
tp1q, . . . , tpµq
)
(5)
is the vector of the corresponding training targetsthat is, observations.
To enable a predictionthat is, interpolation based on information contained in D, we must
make assumptions about the characteristics of the underlying functions, as GPR is a Bayesian
regression method. We start by deﬁning a probability measure on the function space, where fp¨q
lives corresponding to our beliefs. Before seeing any data, we model our state of knowledge about
fp¨q by assigning a GP prior to it. We say that fp¨q is a GP with mean function mp¨;φq and
covariance function kp¨, ¨;φq, and write
fp¨q|φ „ GPpfp¨q|mp¨;φq, kp¨, ¨;φqq, (6)
where φ P Θ Ă Rdθ and dθ P N are the so-called hyper-parameters of the model. The covariance
matrix can be chosen, but must be positive semi-deﬁnite and symmetric. Througout our work, we
use the square exponential (SE)
kSEpx,x1;φq “ s2 exp
#
´1
2
Nÿ
i“1
pxi ´ x1iq2
`2i
+
, (7)
where φ “ ts, `1, . . . , `Nu, with s ą 0 being the variability of the latent function V , and `i ą 0 the
characteristic lengthscale of the i-th input. The hyper-parameters of the covariance function are
typically estimated by maximizing the likelihood (see Scheidegger and Bilionis (2017), and references
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therein). Given a set of training inputs X, Eq. 6 induces a Gaussian prior on the corresponding
response outputs:
f “
!
f
´
xp1q
¯
, . . . , f
´
xpµq
¯)
. (8)
In particular, V is distributed as
f |X, φ „ N p|m,Kq , (9)
where N p¨|m,Kq is the PDF of a multivariate Gaussian random variable with m :“ mpX;φq P Rµ
being the mean function evaluated at all points in X, and K P Rµˆµ is the covariance matrix with
Kij “ kpxpiq,xpjq;φq (see Eq. 7). In the Bayesian framework we are operating in, we have to model
explicitly the measurement process that gives rise to the observations t. We do so by assuming that
measurements are independent of one another, and that they are normally distributed about fp¨q
with variance s2n:
tpiq|f
´
xpiq
¯
, sn „ N
´
tpiq
ˇˇˇ
f
´
xpiq
¯
, s2n
¯
, (10)
where sn ą 0 is an additional hyper-parameter that must be determined from the training targets.
Using the independence of the observations, we get
t|f , sn „ N
`
t
ˇˇ
f , s2nIN
˘
. (11)
The likelihood of the observations is
t|X, φ, sn „ N
`
t
ˇˇ
m,K` s2nIN
˘
. (12)
Bayes's rule combines the prior GP (see Eq. 6) with the likelihood (see Eq. 12) and yields the
posterior GP
fp¨q|X, t, φ, sn „ GP
´
fp¨q
ˇˇˇ
m˜p¨q, k˜p¨, ¨q
¯
, (13)
where the posterior mean and covariance functions are given by
m˜pxq :“ m˜px;φq “ mpx;φq `Kpx,X;φq `K` s2nIN˘´1 pt´mq (14)
and
k˜px,x1q :“ k˜px,x1;φ, snq
“ kpx,x1;φq ´Kpx,X;φq `K` s2nIN˘´1 KpX,x;φq, (15)
respectively. To carry out interpolation tasks when iterating on policies, one has to work with the
predictive (marginal) distribution of the function value fpx˚q for a single test input x˚ conditional
on the hyper-parameters φ and snnamely,
fpx˚q|X, t, φ, sn „ N pfpx˚q|m˜px˚q, σ˜px˚qq , (16)
where m˜px˚q “ m˜px˚;φq is the predictive mean given by Eq. 14, and σ˜2px˚q :“ k˜px˚,x˚;φ, snq is
the predictive variance. Note that the predictive mean can be used as interpolation value.
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6.2 Active subspaces
Standard GPs are not able to deal with very high input dimensions. This is because they rely on
the Euclidean distance to deﬁne input-space correlations. Since the Euclidean distance becomes
uninformative as the dimensionality of the input space increases (Bengio et al., 2005), the number
of observations required to learn the function grows enormously. To this end, following Scheidegger
and Bilionis (2017), we couple GPs to active subspaces (see, e.g., Constantine et al. (2014)).
One way of dealing with this problem is to discover and exploit structures that reduce the
dimensionality of the input space. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the response surface can be well
approximated with the following form:
fpxq « h `WTx˘ , (17)
where the matrix W P RDˆd projects the high-dimensional input space, RD, to the low-dimensional
active subspace, Rd, d ! D, and h : Rd Ñ R is a d-dimensional function known as the link function.
Note that the representation of Eq. 17 is not unique. All matrices W whose columns span the same
subspace of Rd yield identical approximations. Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict our
attention to matrices with orthogonal columns. An added beneﬁt of enforcing this orthogonality is
that the columns of W correspond to directions of the input space on which the response is most
sensitive. Mathematically, we write W P Vd
`
RD
˘
, where Vd
`
RD
˘
is the set of Dˆ d matrices with
orthogonal columns,
Vd
`
RD
˘
:“
!
A P RDˆd : ATA “ Id
)
, (18)
with Id the dˆ d unit matrix. Vd
`
RD
˘
is also known as the Stiefel manifold. If d is much smaller
than D, then the problem of learning the surrogate is signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed.
The standard way to ﬁnd the active subspace requires using gradient information (Constantine,
2015; Lukaczyk et al., 2014; Dow and Wang, 2013), that is, in addition to training data, we need
the respective gradients
G “
!
gp1q, . . . ,gpNq
)
, (19)
where
gpiq “ ∇f
´
xpiq
¯
P RD (20)
and ∇fp¨q is the gradient of fp¨q,
∇fp¨q “
ˆBfp¨q
Bx1 , . . . ,
Bfp¨q
BxD
˙
. (21)
The approach here operates in two steps. First, it identiﬁes the projection matrix W P Vd
`
RD
˘
using gradient information. Second, it projects all inputs to the active subspace and then applies
GP regression to learn the map between the projected inputs and the output.
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Let ρpxq be a PDF on the input space such as the PDF of a uniform random variable, and deﬁne
the matrix
C :“
ż
p∇fpxqqp∇fpxqqTρpxqdx. (22)
Since C is symmetric positive deﬁnite, it admits the form
C “ VΛVT , (23)
where Λ “ diagpλ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , λDq is a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of C in decreasing
order, λ1 ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě λD ě 0, and V P RDˆD is an orthonormal matrix whose columns correspond to
the eigenvectors of C. The classical AS approach suggests separating the d largest eigenvalues from
the rest,
Λ “
»–Λ1 0
0 Λ2
fifl , V “ ”V1 V2ı ,
(here Λ1 “ diagpλ1, . . . , λdq,V1 “ rv11 . . .v1ds, and Λ2,V2 are deﬁned analogously), and setting
the projection matrix to
W “ V1. (24)
Intuitively, V rotates the input space so that the directions associated with the largest eigenvalues
correspond to directions of maximal function variability (Constantine, 2015).
It is impossible to evaluate Eq. 22 exactly. Instead, the usual practice is to approximate the
integral via MC, that is, assuming that the observed inputs are drawn from ρpxq, one approximates
C using the observed gradients by
CN “ 1
N
Nÿ
i“1
gpiq
´
gpiq
¯T
. (25)
In practice, the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of CN are found using the singular value decompo-
sition (Golub and Van Loan, 1996) of CN . The dimensionality d is determined by looking for
sharp drops in the spectrum of CN (Constantine, 2015), or by looking at the Bayesian information
criterion.
6.3 Bayesian Gaussian mixture models
To generate training data from the simulated policies, we need to be able to sample from a probability
distribution of the state space that was visited in the previous iteration. To do so, we apply Bayesian
Gaussian mixture modelss. Mixture of Gaussians are a form of unsupervised machine learning (see,
e.g., Murphy (2012)), and are commonly applied to approximate probability distributions from
observed data. Suppose that we have m data samples X “ txi : 1 ď i ď mu. One then can
approximate any probability density by ρ « ρestimated as a mixture of Gaussians:
ρestimatedpxq “
Lÿ
l“1
pilN px|µl,Σlq, (26)
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where the mean vectors µl P RN , the covariance matrices Σl P RNˆN , the weights pil with
řL
l“1 pil “
1, and the number of components L are ﬁtted to X (see, e.g., Rasmussen (2000) and Blei and Jordan
(2005)).
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Figure 1: Linear forecasts
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Figure 2: Linear forecasts in nonlinear world
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